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Based on provincial panel data from 2003 to 2012, this paper discusses the 
influence of resource endowment on political promotion of local government official 
and economic development. This paper emphases on the relationship between resource 
endowment and political promotion, through empirical examination we find that the 
relationship between them is invert u-shaped curve. As the resource endowment 
increase, the political promotion probability increase first and then decrease.  
Then the article analyzes the transmission mechanism of how resource endowment 
affect political promotion, we found that economic performance and environmental 
quality are two paths. In regions with abundant resource endowment, officials would 
like to offer preferential policies to resources industry and attract capital investment. 
Rapid economic growth could increase the probability of political promotion; The 
“resource curse” will appear when resource dependence exceed a certain threshold, 
diminishing marginal utility of resource endowment in stimulating the economy or even 
hinder economic growth. The evaluation of GDP will make the inflection point of 
promotion’s U shape curve come ahead of time, officials blindly pursuing economic 
performance will lead to “resource curse” phenomenon. Due to energy intensive and 
highly polluting characteristic, the development of resources industry will cause 
adverse impact on ecological environment. In recent years, the central government 
gradually link environment quality and the officials achievements together, 
environmental pollution will reduce the probability of official promotion. The 
assessment of environmental quality indicators can push local governments to improve 
the ecological environment and the satisfaction of the residents, which could put off the 
appearance of promotion inflection point. Combined with the results analyzed above, 
this paper argues that diversify the evaluation indices of local government will help to 
makes better use of regional resource endowment advantage. 















relationship between resource endowment and economic development and found that 
the relationship between them is also invert u-shaped curve. As the degree of resources 
dependence increase, the economic development level increases first and then decrease. 
The article also discusses the transmission channels, we found that resource endowment 
could enhance economic development through social capital investment, while 
corruption is the reason for the “resource curse”. In China, the resource exploitation 
requires the approval of government department, corruption and rent-seeking are easy 
to appear during the development of resource industry. Corruption will undermine 
material capital investment channels, thus plays an inhibitory effect on economic 
growth. Resource industry has natural monopoly nature, the elaborate division of 
production in large-scale enterprise will lead to the lack of entrepreneurial spirit and 
economy vitality. Furthermore, the excessive dependence on resource economy will 
also have extrusion effect on private economy. To sum up, establishing fair and honest 
system, encouraging technological innovation and cultivating entrepreneurship are 
important ways to avoid the curse of resource.  
The results of this paper provides a different angle to study China’s political 
promotion mechanism, it explains the promotion speed differences from the perspective 
of resource endowment. The political promotion mechanism discussed in this paper can 
help the central government to improve the official assessment indicators. It will make 
local officials use power more reasonably and serve better. Furthermore, this paper 
doesn’t treat resource endowment as “gospel” or “curse” on economic development 
simply. Instead, it discusses the non-linear relationship between resource endowment 
and economic development. Focusing on the level of corruption, entrepreneurial 
atmosphere and other channels, this paper explain the transmission mechanism of 
“resource curse”, which contribute to a deeper understanding about how resource 
endowment influence economic development. 
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第一章  绪论 
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第二章  文献综述 










外，目前学界一种主流的观点是以 Blanchard and Shleifer(2001) [5]、周黎安(2007) 
[6]为代表的官员晋升锦标赛机制。这种观点认为，地方政府官员与职业经理人一
样面临着晋升激励，官员们会选择推动其任期内辖区经济增长，获得中央领导肯
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